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 1. Introduction 
Criminal behavior varies greatly according to the time of day but, while Felson and 
Poulsen (2003) note that monthly and seasonal cycles of crime are well-known 
periodicities among criminologists (see, for example, Harries, 1980), the hourly 
periodicity of crime is under-researched. This lack of research is surprising if we 
consider that several existing theoretical approaches to the understanding of illegal 
behavior, including routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), stress the 
essential role of hourly activities and their association with crime opportunities (see 
Felson, 2002). A possible explanation for this absence of formal study of the temporal 
patterns of crime is because spatial patterns have tended to focus all the research 
attention. Indeed, the tools developed by geographers have been widely used in the 
spatial mapping of criminal activity and for the statistical description of spatial 
processes, leaving the temporal element in a secondary plane. 
However, time would seem to play an important role in its own right in defining 
illegal activities. For instance, time defines when people stumble out of bars, when 
alcohol or other stupefacients are consumed (concentrating around bar closing times), 
when drink driving tests are performed by police patrols or when the working day 
begins and ends. All these events can affect the number of potential offenders, the 
number of suitable targets and the presence (or otherwise) of police forces and, 
therefore, in line with routine activity theory, they have a direct impact on criminal 
activities. 
The impact of time on crime, however, can be a priori positive or negative. On the 
one hand, a positive impact can be expected, given that at certain times of day crime is 
more likely to occur because of the routines and activities that are being engaged in 
(work, leisure, etc.). On the other hand, activities that are clearly demarcated by time 
may have a displacement effect and, hence, a negative effect on crime. In this respect, 
crime displacement may be defined as the relocation of crime from a particular time, 
place, target, offense, or tactic to another as a result of some activity and/or crime 
prevention initiative. Spatial displacement is by far the most commonly recognized 
form, but the other forms are also frequently acknowledged by researchers as they 
examine the impact of crime prevention policies. 
More specifically, the possible forms of displacement are temporal (offenders 
change the time of day when they commit a crime); spatial (offenders switch from 
targets in one location to those in another); target (offenders change from one type of 
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 target to another); tactical (offenders change the methods used to carry out a crime); and 
offense (offenders switch from one form of crime to another). Clearly, it is crucial to 
have a good comprehensive understanding of all of them so that the police forces might 
define prevention initiatives to tackle criminal activities. 
The aim of this paper therefore is twofold. On the one hand, and drawing on a 
unique dataset, we analyze the temporal profile of urban crime in Barcelona (Spain) in 
an attempt at obtaining further evidence of monthly, weekly and hourly patterns of 
crime. We undertake an in-depth examination of the temporal nature of crime by 
determining if there is a temporal displacement of crime attributable to major events in 
the city of Barcelona, more specifically in relation to the matches played by Football 
Club Barcelona (FCB, hereafter). The social importance of football in Spanish society 
makes it an ideal event for determining whether the sport is responsible for a temporal 
displacement of crime in the city. Football matches, major sporting events that attract a 
large proportion of the population, provide excellent scenarios for analyzing temporal 
displacement, given that for certain periods of time (before, during and after the match) 
the feelings and attitudes of individuals are subject to fluctuation. Such a differentiated 
time profile is, therefore, optimal for analyzing the potential temporal effects on crime. 
Moreover, given the media coverage dedicated to football, these effects are not 
necessarily spatially constrained and, so, football matches are ideal for analyzing 
temporal displacement effects in criminal activities, and should further our 
understanding of the relationship between crime and time. The results of this analysis 
should provide interesting insights into the impact of football on crime, a particularly 
relevant issue today for governments concerned with the security issues related to major 
sporting events, among others.1 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the various 
temporal patterns presented by crime data by reporting a descriptive analysis of crime 
on a monthly, weekly and hourly basis. Section 3 analyses the potential channels 
through which football matches may affect criminal activity. Section 4 describes the 
unique dataset on recorded crime for the city of Barcelona and outlines the methodology 
employed. Section 5 presents the main results regarding the temporal effect of football 
on crime while Section 6 presents the results for the case of defeats and violent crimes. 
Section 7 discusses the main results. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
                                                          
1 See, for instance, Marie (2010) or the latest episodes of violence that have occurred in and around 
Spain’s football grounds (http://deportes.elpais.com/tag/operacion_neptuno/a/) 
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2. Temporal crime patterns: a descriptive analysis for the city of Barcelona 
This section analyzes monthly, weekly and hourly crime patterns for the following 
crime types: property crimes (Robberies, Thefts and Criminal damage), crimes against 
the person (Violent crimes and Gender violence) and other crimes (Against police, 
Driving crimes and Drug related crimes).2 
Figure 1 (panels a to h) gives us a broad temporal picture of the evolution of the sum 
of offenses, by month, for each type of crime. Several features are worth highlighting. 
First, all types of crime, with the exception of Robberies (which presents an upward 
trend) and Gender violence (which presents a downward trend), are quite stable within 
the period of study (January 2007 – December 2011). Without seeking to be exhaustive, 
a priori, the reduction in the number of family related crimes (Gender violence) could 
be related, on the one hand, to the resources devoted by governments (national, regional 
and local) to tackling this problem in Spanish society3 and, on the other, to the impact 
that an economic crisis can have on report rates for this type of crime. 
As expected, there seems to be a marked seasonal effect with an increase in Violent 
crimes and, especially, Thefts in the summer. This would appear to be associated with 
the massive arrival of tourists – attractive targets for pickpockets – to the city during 
these months.4 
It should perhaps be pointed out that the sharp rise in Driving crimes recorded from 
the end of the year 2007 reflects the new traffic regulations (Ley Orgánica 15/2007) 
passed on the 30th of November,5 which increased the severity of such crimes and hence 
the number of offences (see BOE, 2007). 
Figure 2 (panels a to h) presents the weekly trend for each type of crime. The daily 
number of crimes of each type has been calculated by taking the average of all daily 
crime counts for the period of study (2007-2011). For all types of crimes there is a 
weekend effect with crime rates increasing significantly during the weekend.6  
 
                                                          
2 See Section 4 for more details on the data used and Table 1 for a precise definition of each type of crime 
used. 
3 Counselling, social housing, rapid police responses to aggressions and faster trials of offenders are some 
of the policies that have been adopted in recent years in Spain to tackle this problem. 
4 Tourists are known to carry valuable items on their person, including cameras and cell phones. This, 
together with a low level of surveillance, makes them attractive targets for offenders. See Montolio and 
Planells-Struse (2013) for an analysis of the impact of tourism on crime for the Spanish case. 
5 The law actually came into effect on 2nd of December. 
6 The marked weekend effect observed for Gender violence has also been reported in Vazquez et al. 
(2005) and Gantz et al. (2006). 
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Figure 1: Monthly crime evolution. 
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Panel 1b: Thefts 
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Panel 1c: Criminal damage 
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Panel 1d: Violent crimes 
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Panel 1e: Gender violence 
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Panel 1f: Against police 
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Panel 1g: Driving crimes 
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Panel 1h: Drug related crimes 
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 Figure 2: Weekly crime evolution. 
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Panel 2e: Gender violence 
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 In general, rates fall from Sunday to Tuesday/Wednesday; thereafter, they begin to 
rise again reaching a peak on Saturday/Sunday. Note the low level of reports made for 
drug consumption and trafficking on Sundays (a crime that peaks on Fridays), a pattern 
that might reflect the incapacitation of drug users by Sunday (i.e., drug consumption is 
highest on Fridays and Saturdays, with users resting on Sundays before the start of the 
week). 
Finally, Figure 3 (panels a to h) shows the hourly patterns of crime. We compute the 
average number of crimes (by type) for every hour of the day.7 Various patterns emerge. 
Robberies (panel 3a) and Thefts (panel 3b) present similar profiles: both peak at 19:00 
(when people leave work on working days) following an upturn after 15:00. In both 
cases, rates are lowest around 9:00, increasing up to 13:00 and falling during lunch time 
(13:00-15:00). Criminal damage committed against the property of others (panel 3c) 
also peaks at 19:00 and is concentrated in the evening hours while during the rest of the 
day there is little fluctuation in the rate.  
Panel 3e shows the evolution of Gender violence, with rates peaking in the late 
evening (having gradually increased throughout the day) and dropping off at night. 
Violent crimes (panel 3d) follows a similar pattern with an increasing rate from the early 
morning to a peak at around 19.00, but a second peak emerges at around 04:00 in the 
early morning. This is presumably associated with activities in leisure areas that end up 
in brawls and fights which, if reported to police, are likely to be catalogued as violent 
crimes. 
In the case of the other types of illegal activity, crimes Against police (panel 3f) 
peaks at night (00.00 - 03.00), again presumably related with the attempts of police 
forces to actively control leisure activities, which are likely to result in illegal behavior. 
This seems to be confirmed by Driving crimes (panel 3g) and Drug related crimes 
(panel 3h), which present very similar time profiles, although the latter presents a 
second peak between 19:00 and 20:00 (after working hours). 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 The vertical lines plotted in all the panels of Figure 3 denote the typical kick off and final whistle times 
for FCB football matches (20:00 and 22:00); see footnote 11 for more details. Additionally, and given its 
utility for the subsequent analysis, Figure 3 plots the hourly evolution of crime for days when no matches 
were played (No game) and for days when FCB played at home (Home game) and when the club played 
away (Away game). 
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Figure 3: Hourly crime evolution. 
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 Interestingly, the hourly evolution of the eight typologies of crime analyzed above 
can be broadly summarized in three time patterns: first, crimes related to leisure 
activities (crimes Against police, Driving crimes and Drug related crimes), with peaks 
late at night, low rates during the day-time and rates that increase as the evening 
progresses; second, crimes against property (Robberies, Thefts and Criminal damage), 
with low rates at night and a clear peak around 18:00 (related to the time when people 
are leaving work on weekdays); and, third, crimes involving violence (Violent crimes 
and Gender violence), with rates that increase throughout the day, peaking in the 
evenings. The crime types that might benefit from the hours of darkness (drug related 
crimes, violent crimes and criminal damage) occur more frequently during the evening, 
as corroborated by Calandrillo and Buehler (2008). 
 
3. Football, time and crime 
Having described the temporal profile of crime in the city of Barcelona and having 
shown that crime varies markedly with time, we now explore whether some activities 
might displace illegal activities in time. Barcelona is a busy city offering a wide range 
of cultural and tourist activities (not to mention those organized by the city’s 
neighborhood associations), which can be examined in order to detect the existence of 
any kind of relationship between the timing of these activities and criminal activity. 
Barcelona, moreover, has a long tradition in hosting leading sporting events, 
commencing in 1992 with the Olympic Games and more recently with the organization 
of numerous World and European Championships, including swimming (2003 and 
2013), athletics (2010), basketball (2014) and handball (2013).8 And, of course, 
Barcelona, as home to FCB and RCD Espanyol, plays host to football matches on a 
regular basis.9 
Despite the positive economic effects that hosting a world-wide famous football 
club undoubtedly has for the city of Barcelona (for a cross-country comparison, see, 
Sterken, 2006, and Allmers and Maening, 2009), a number of negative externalities 
arise from its being home to such a major team and its hosting of such large events on a 
                                                          
8 Barcelona is also the frequent host of many Spanish Championships in a variety of disciplines. 
9 RCD Espanyol attracts less support than FCB. By way of illustration, RDC Espanyol has 27,000 
members (paying an annual fee) and around 70,000 followers on Facebook, while FCB has 169,000 
members and more than 45 million followers on Facebook. Moreover, although originally with its home 
ground in Barcelona, RCD Espanyol moved to the neighbouring city of Cornellà-El Prat in September 
2009. Therefore, for the purposes of this study we focus only on the temporal impact FCB matches have 
on criminal behaviour in the city of Barcelona. 
9
 regular basis.10 The literature dealing with the impact of sport on crime has mainly 
focused on the spatial patterns of this relationship (see, for instance, Kurland et al., 
2013; Rees and Schnepel, 2009; Russell, 2004; Marie, 2010; Breetzke and Cohn, 2013; 
Breetzke and Carl, 2009), while only a few studies have focused on the possible 
temporal displacement effects of such events (Card and Dahl, 2011; Doleac and 
Sanders, 2012; Kirk, 2008; Sachs and Chu, 2000). As such, this paper, rather than 
addressing the so-called crime pattern theory (Eck et al., 2007), which states that certain 
specific places (such as football stadiums) are rich in suitable targets and attract 
potential offenders, focuses on the temporal displacement effects of football matches. 
In order to provide an initial, visual evaluation of the potential temporal 
displacement effect of FCB matches on crime, in Figure 3 we depict the hourly crime 
evolution in Barcelona on days when FCB played at home and away as well as on days 
when FCB were not involved in a game.11 In general, the hourly patterns of crime on the 
three types of day are fairly similar; however, closer inspection reveals some interesting 
features. 
In general, home match days and away match days do not differ considerably from 
other non football days except in the time band following the final whistle. In the case 
of Robberies, Thefts, Violent crimes, Gender violence, and crimes Against police 
officers there is an increase in the number of illegal activities in the hours after the 
football (both for home and away games). The same is true for Driving crimes, but in 
this case five to six hours after the match has finished. For Criminal damage, there are 
no apparent differences across the different types of day analyzed, while there is a lower 
level of Drug related crimes in the hours following home matches.  
Certain characteristics of the days under analysis provide us with plausible 
explanations for the crime patterns observed. For instance, police deployment when 
FCB are playing at home to guarantee the protection of those going to the stadium or 
congregating in recreational areas to watch the match may be responsible for the 
marked increase observed in crimes Against police officers on home match days (given 
the greater interaction between fans and police officers), a decrease in Drug related 
                                                          
10 Given that FCB typically gets to the final rounds of most of the competitions that it enters means that in 
some periods of the season, the club is playing almost every three days (taking into account both home 
and away matches). 
11 Note that FCB matches kick off at different times, depending on the match and on the competition. For 
instance Champions League matches always kick-off at 20:45 (CET), however, Domestic League 
matches may vary, the average starting time being 20:20 (and the mode 20:35). In Figure 3, therefore, the 
additional vertical lines correspond to a 20:00 starting time and 22:00 final whistle. 
10
 crimes as the police are concerned with other security issues, and also the time profile of 
Driving crimes with traffic checkpoints being set up after matches. 
Fluctuations in supporters’ emotions following a defeat or victory may account in 
part for the sharp increase in Violent crimes, the rate of which also increases in the 
hours prior to a match. The same post-match pattern is observed for Robberies and, 
albeit to a lesser extent, for Thefts, which in the case of the city of Barcelona are limited 
mainly to pick pocketing. Incidents of Gender violence also seem to rise on match days, 
but the graphical evidence here is less conclusive. 
Clearly the preceding has been an attempt at providing a descriptive approximation 
of the evolution of crime over time, and the possible effects that a major sporting event 
can have on illegal behavior. In the next section, we address the issue by means of 
formal estimations taking into account other possible determinants of the differences 
observed (day of the week, type of match, weather conditions, etc.) in crime patterns 
across football and non-football days. 
 
4. Data and empirical methodology 
4.1. Crime data 
In this section we formally describe our unique data (used in the previous sections to 
describe the time patterns of crime). We use a non-public dataset for the city of 
Barcelona containing all registered crimes obtained from the autonomous police agency 
in Catalonia (Spanish region in which Barcelona is located), the Mossos d'Esquadra, 
which is responsible for crime prevention, crime solving and specialized crime 
investigation in the Catalan region.12 The dataset contains reports made both by citizens 
and police officers. Additionally, the dataset contains information on all the crimes 
registered by Barcelona’s local police (the Guardia Urbana), responsible primarily for 
urban traffic and upholding municipal laws and ordinances. 
The crime dataset records the time of the crime (when known) and the exact 
location. The dataset spans from 2007 to 2011 and is classified according to the more 
than 190 articles making up the Spanish penal code.13 In order to reduce the number of 
categories without creating an aggregation bias (Cherry and List, 2002) that could 
                                                          
12 The Mossos d'Esquadra are responsible for virtually all police duties. The Spanish National Police 
(Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) and the military police (Guardia Civil) retain a number of administrative 
responsibilities (e.g., issuing of identity cards and passports) and undertake counter-terrorist and anti-
mafia activities. 
13 The Mossos d'Esquadra were fully deployed in the city of Barcelona in 2006. 
11
 reduce the effectiveness of our estimations, we combined some of these articles 
according to the type of crime, paying particular attention not to aggregate crimes with 
different offender motivations (for example, crimes against the person and crimes 
against property). Table 1 specifies the type of crime included in each category.  
 
Table 1: Crime classification. 
Type Description 
Property Crimes 
Robberies Misappropriation of the belongings of others against their will with the use of violence. 
Thefts Misappropriation of the belongings of others against their will without the use of any violence. 
Criminal damage Minor/serious damage to the belongings/property of others. 
Crimes against the Person 
Violent crimes Physical injuries to other individuals. Mass fights and brawls. 
Gender violence Abuse in the home. Physical and psychological violence in the home. 
Other Crimes 
Against police Misconduct, intimidation, resistance, use of force and aggressions against police officers. 
Driving crimes 
Dangerous driving. Driving with no license. Driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs (considered a serious crime when alcohol tests are 
above a certain threshold). Endanger lives of other drivers. 
Drug related crimes Drug consumption in public areas and drug trafficking. The amount of drugs determines the classification. 
 
For the main property crimes, we include Robberies, i.e., the use of violence in the  
misappropriation of the belongings of others, as opposed to Thefts, which do not involve 
any violence. Among property crimes, we also include Criminal damage which 
accounts for any type of damage caused to the belongings of others. Aggregated 
categories of property crime often include this type of crime but the motivation that may 
lead an offender to commit a theft or criminal damage are clearly different.  
Among violent, interpersonal crimes we include the category Gender violence, 
which refers to crimes committed against a family member, and Violent crimes, which 
includes the inflicting of injuries of any type against another person or persons. This 
category also includes fights that break out among crowds in places of leisure (such as 
night clubs or discos) or at major events (such as football matches). 
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 Finally, we create a separate category (Other crimes) to account for special types of 
crime normally reported by police officers and not by citizens. Broadly speaking, this 
means that if the police are not concerned with these crimes, they tend to go unreported 
and so are not accounted for in the registered crime data. In this category we include 
crimes Against police, i.e., misconduct (normally reported by the police themselves), 
such as, disobeying police orders or injuring a police officer; Driving crimes, i.e., 
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol or traffic violations that endanger the 
lives of others; and, finally, Drug related crimes, i.e., crimes related to drug trafficking 
and/or consumption. 
Table 2 shows the main descriptive statistics of the crime types used in this study. It 
is evident that property crimes are much more common than other types of crime. The 
most common offence committed in the city of Barcelona is that of Thefts, primarily 
pick pocketing, with a daily average of 306.79 recorded instances (nearly ten times 
greater than Robberies and Criminal damage). Fewer crimes against the person are 
recorded, although the figures for Gender violence are worrying given their 
implications. Finally, Driving crimes are the most common crime type among those 
directly recorded by police officers. 
 
Table 2: Average number of crimes by different time dimensions. 
Type Hour Day Month Year 
Property Crimes    
Robberies 1.46 (1.43) 
34.96 
(8.73) 
1,064.39 
(144.44) 
11,069.6 
(4,430.41) 
Thefts 12.80 (8.58) 
306.79 
(61.57) 
9,339.25 
(1,273.94) 
97,128.2 
(34,918.44) 
Criminal damage 1.50 (1.55) 
35.96 
(9.84) 
1,094.69 
(128.42) 
11,384.8 
(4,329.19) 
Crimes against the Person    
Violent crimes 0.55 (0.81) 
13.21 
(4.80) 
402.25 
(36.90) 
4,183.4 
(1,507.29) 
Gender violence 0.29 (0.56) 
6.95 
(3.16) 
211.48 
(37.31) 
2,199.4 
(787.54) 
Other Crimes    
Against police 0.11 (0.41) 
2.63 
(2.63) 
79.96 
(19.18) 
831.6 
(288.21) 
Driving crimes 0.41 (0.75) 
9.75 
(5.23) 
296.85 
(65.55) 
3,087.2 
(1,425.48) 
Drug related crimes 0.15 (0.41) 
3.56 
(2.09) 
108.40 
(20.18) 
1,127.4 
(438.09) 
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 In order to control the size of our analysis, and given that our focus is on the 
temporality of crime, we have opted not to include crimes such as Burglary (illegal 
entry into a building for the purposes of committing an offence) and Car theft. Note that 
all the crime types included in Table 1 are characterized by the fact that the timing of 
the offence can be quite accurately determined, either because they directly involve 
victims and offenders or because they are reported by police officers. In contrast, just 
when exactly a Burglary or a Car theft occurred is usually unknown, and has to be 
approximated by police officers (or victims) when filing the complaint. Moreover, 
police officers usually state a time window for when the crime is likely to have 
occurred. Therefore, so as not to distort the main aim of the study – namely, the time 
analysis of crime and the possible (hourly) displacement effect of football matches, we 
do not include these crimes. 
 
4.2. Football data 
We merge the above hourly crime dataset with the dataset containing all the football 
matches played by FCB between the 25th of September 2007 and the 31st of December 
2011. The latter contains information regarding the day, the exact time of the match, the 
rival, the match result, the number of spectators and whether it was played at home or 
away match. Table 3 summarizes the number of matches by level of attendance and by 
type of match. It shows that the level of attendance was high for home matches, with 
70% attracting more than 60,000 spectators to the stadium and just seven presenting an 
attendance of less than 40,000 spectators. 
 
Table 3: FCB football matches 2007-2011. 
Attendance # of matches in the sample 
> 80,000 spectators 36 
> 60,000 and < 80,000 spectators 58 
> 40,000 and < 60,000 spectators 24 
< 40,000 spectators 7 
Home matches 125 
Away matches 130 
Type of match 
Spanish Domestic League 169 
Spanish King’s Cup 32 
European Champions League 50 
Spanish and International Super Cups 4 
Note: In this period FCB played Real Madrid CF, its main rival, ten times (home and away). 
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 Our dataset contains a total of 125 home and 130 away matches. Most of the 
matches were played in the Spanish domestic league (169). The Spanish King’s Cup is 
the second most important domestic competition (32 matches played); however, the 
European Champions League is the competition that attracts by far the most spectators 
(50 matches played). Table 4 completes the description of the datasets used in this paper 
presenting the main types of crimes by match day type (no match, home match and 
away match).  
 
Table 4: Daily average number of reported crimes by typology and by type of match 
played. 
Crime type No Match Home Match Away Match 
Property Crimes    
Robberies 34.95 36.29 35.68 
Thefts 288.02 310.96 303.68 
Criminal damage 8.15 8.27 9.19 
Crimes Against the Person    
Violent crimes 12.71 14.03 14.55 
Gender violence 6.78 7.30 7.32 
Other Crimes    
Against police 2.53 2.64 2.98 
Driving crimes 9.43 10.61 11.95 
Drug related crimes 3.62 3.15 3.58 
 
4.3. Empirical methodology 
The evidence presented above seems to indicate a clear crime time profile and that a 
major event, such as a football match, can influence criminal behavior, especially after 
the event. In order to study the temporal behavior of crime and potentially distinct 
patterns on match days, we use a panel approach comprising two time dimensions: time 
of day and days. Thus, we compare the same times on different days while controlling 
for any potential source of heterogeneity across days, weeks, months and years. The 
empirical model used is the following: 
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+        (1) 
 
where k denotes the type of crime, d denotes the day in our time span running from the 
25th September 2007 to 31st December 2011 and h is the time of day from 00:00 to 
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 23:00. t denotes the type of match played (home or away);14 thus, the variable Matchtd,h 
can be transformed into Homed,h and Awayd,h, which are dummy variables taking a value 
of 1 if it is a time when there is a home or an away match being played, respectively, 
and 0 otherwise.15 The subscript l denotes the lag and lead effects of home and away 
matches. We analyze a period of up to seven hours before and after the match, assuming 
this to be a reasonable time period to observe the displacement effect of football on 
crime rates. 
In Eq. (1) Xd represents a vector of control variables that can affect (recorded) crime, 
such as weather variables (average rainfall, average number of sun hours, average 
temperature, average pressure, average wind speed).16 The weather has long been 
recognized to be an important factor influencing crime dynamics. For instance, higher 
temperatures can explain, through a psychological effect, higher levels of violent crimes 
(Anderson, 2001; Harries et al., 1980; Jacob et al., 2004). Rain has also been shown to 
be a determinant in explaining lower levels of violent crime, perhaps due to the lack of 
social interactions among individuals (people are more likely to stay at home and not go 
out) or due to the lack of potential targets. We also include a dummy variable 
accounting for the lunar phase (indicating the presence of the full moon) since some 
police agencies have reported experiencing higher levels of violent crime when there is 
a full moon.17 This set of control variables is completed by a dummy variable that 
indicates if a particular day is a bank holiday; summer and winter seasonal dummies, 
dummies for days (home and away) with special matches such as the big derby between 
historic rivals FCB and Real Madrid CF which is considered, by the police, as a 
potentially dangerous match, and dummies to control for the type of competition 
(Spanish Domestic League, European Champions League, Spanish King’s Cup, Spanish 
Super Cup and International Super Cup) since this may determine the typology of 
person interested in (and following) the match. 
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity across time, days, weeks and years 
in our data span, we include a full set of time fixed effects. First, we include an hour of 
the day fixed effect (γh) since, as shown in Figure 3, those hours with the greatest 
                                                          
14 We retain only those months corresponding to the football season in the sample; that is, we discard the 
summer months from the beginning of June to the end of August. Recall, the summer months are 
characterized by high seasonal crime records. 
15 We assume a match has a two-hour duration (90 minutes plus stoppage time). 
16 Weather variables present daily variation. 
17 See “Crackdown on lunar-fuelled crime”. BBC News. 5 June 2007 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/kent/6723911.stm (last accessed 14 March 2014). 
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 movement of workers (early morning or after work) are more likely to coincide with the 
peak times for pick pocketing.18 By including hour of the day fixed effects, we capture 
this unobservable time characteristic and ensure our estimations of the effect of football 
matches on crime are unbiased. Second, we include three types of dummies related to 
different days (γdc); (i) day of the week fixed effects to account for the heterogeneity of 
crime across days. As shown in Figure 2, there is a clear weekend effect (maybe due to 
higher outdoor/leisure mobility of individuals or to higher alcohol and drug 
consumption). By including these specific day of the week fixed effects we can capture 
these weekend effects as well as other specific day effects, such as, (ii) day of the month 
fixed effects, which account for days with specific monthly characteristics (for instance, 
pay day in the lasts days of a month); and (iii) day of the year fixed effects, which 
control for special days such as Christmas Day, New Year’s Eve, local holidays (fiestas) 
or any other special day. 
Third, we also include week of the year (γw), month of the year (γm) and annual fixed 
effects (γy). Finally, we draw on monthly and yearly trends to account for potential 
trends (e.g., thefts increase from the beginning of the year to the end of August) or for 
different levels of popularity expressed for FCB (e.g., the club may be more popular one 
year because it won a major title the previous season or because it bought a world-class 
player). 
As we employ hourly data, the crime count in our dataset is positively skewed with 
a large presence of zeros. Taking logs would result in a considerable increase in the 
number of missing values, which could bias our estimations. In order to deal with data 
of this type, we follow Marie (2010) and Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) and use a 
negative binomial approach. Such estimations constitute a generalization of the Poisson 
model but allow for the over dispersion of data, in other words, they allow for the 
variance of the outcome to differ from the mean. 
 
5. Main results 
In this section we present the results of estimating Eq. (1), that is, the temporal 
effect of football on crime. The columns of each table of results present the different 
crime types considered. All the regressions include the full set of controls previously 
presented. Note that given that we estimate a negative binomial model, the coefficients 
                                                          
18 All the temporal fixed effects and trends included in the regressions have been based on the descriptive 
temporal crime analysis carried out in the previous section. 
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 reported are the incidence rate ratios that represent the increase or decrease in 
percentage of the number of counts of each crime type. 
 
Table 5: FCB home matches attendance and crime in the city at time of the match. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Robberies Thefts Criminal damage 
Violent 
crimes 
Gender 
Violence
Against 
Police 
Driving 
crimes Drugs 
Stadium attendance 0.974** 1.013 1.007 0.999 0.981 0.963 0.959 1.017 
 (0.0102) (0.00955) (0.00995) (0.0219) (0.0207) (0.0494) (0.0258) (0.659)
>80,000 0.802** 1.023 1.023 0.743* 0.959 0.496* 0.624* 0.727 
 (0.0827) (0.0406) (0.0688) (0.117) (0.189) (0.208) (0.176) (0.236)
>60,000 0.930 0.986 1.009 0.929 0.780 0.878 0.783 0.707 
 (0.0691) (0.0356) (0.0658) (0.115) (0.124) (0.260) (0.159) (0.159)
>40,000 0.781* 0.908* 0.961 1.137 0.999 0.443 0.745 0.462 
 (0.112) (0.0475) (0.0970) (0.187) (0.257) (0.307) (0.222) (0.227)
>20,000 1.014 0.964 1.045 1.045 1.004 1.689 0.999 0.602 
 (0.241) (0.0955) (0.172) (0.382) (0.258) (1.225) (0.645) (0.391)
Observations 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123
Climate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Yearly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lunar phase YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Holiday dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of competition YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Attendance is expressed in 10,000. >80,000, for instance, is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for 
matches with an attendance above the specified threshold. The estimations for each level of attendance 
are performed separately. Climate controls include: average rainfall, average number of sun hours, 
average temperature, average pressure and average wind speed. Time controls include: hour of the day, 
day of the week, day of the month, day of the year, week of the year, month and year. Seasonal controls 
include dummies for summer (mainly September) and winter. Type of competition includes dummies for: 
Spanish Domestic League, European Champions League, Spanish King’s Cup and Super Cups (both 
Spanish and International). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the impact of FCB playing at home on crime, focusing 
on the time when the games are played (recall, we consider a game to have a duration of 
two hours (20:00 – 22:00). The first row represents the impact of an increase of 10,000 
spectators on the different types of crime. For the case of Robberies, the coefficient 
presents a decrease in the expected number of Robberies of 2.6% (1-0.974) during the 
football match for each 10,000 additional spectators in the stadium. Similarly, the 
following rows analyze the effect of different matches depending on attendance. In 
general, it seems that football matches only have a significant impact on crime (for the 
duration of the game), in the case of those attended by over 80,000 spectators. These 
matches are typically important games for FCB. During such matches, there is a 
decrease in the number of Robberies in the city, and there is some weak evidence of a 
reduction in crimes Against police, the number of Driving crimes and Violent crimes 
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 during the two hours of the game. This lack of significant results for crime during the 
time of the match (or even the reductions in some crime types) might point to an 
incapacitation effect on offenders, as found by Dahl and DellaVigna (2009) in relation 
to violent movies.19 The detailed results for the vector of control variables (Xd) for the 
above estimation are reported in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Control variables.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Robberies Thefts Criminal damage 
Violent 
crimes 
Gender 
Violence 
Against 
Police 
Driving 
crimes Drugs 
Rainfall 0.998** 0.998*** 1.002** 0.996** 0.999 0.999 0.996** 0.996 
 (0.00093) (0.0004) (0.00094) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0029) 
Sun hours 1.004** 1.006*** 1.006*** 1.006** 0.993 1.009 1.000 0.997 
 (0.00195) (0.0009) (0.00190) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0072) (0.0036) (0.0056) 
Temperature 1.009*** 1.008*** 0.999 1.012*** 1.015*** 1.001 1.023*** 1.021***
 (0.00236) (0.0012) (0.00226) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0083) (0.0045) (0.0072) 
Pressure 1.000** 1.000** 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.00005) (0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Wind speed 0.998** 0.999* 0.998* 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.997* 0.993** 
 (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0031) 
Summer dummy 0.524** 0.863 1.061 1.480 1.914 1.111 0.720 2.108 
 (0.142) (0.112) (0.241) (0.679) (0.874) (1.256) (0.361) (1.387) 
Winter dummy 1.357 0.996 0.903 3.206*** 0.450 0.680 0.634 0.539 
 (0.383) (0.123) (0.256) (1.306) (0.298) (0.622) (0.393) (0.437) 
Lunar phase 0.996 1.020 1.038 1.021 1.087 0.927 1.045 0.985 
 (0.0335) (0.0168) (0.0342) (0.0543) (0.0746) (0.111) (0.0656) (0.0974) 
Holiday dummy 0.993 0.981 0.953* 1.038 0.952 1.183 0.962 1.136 
 (0.0289) (0.0147) (0.0267) (0.0470) (0.0573) (0.127) (0.0497) (0.0986) 
Derby dummy 0.868 1.045 1.063 1.910** 1.447 2.356 0.704 0.753 
 (0.243) (0.114) (0.133) (0.540) (0.423) (1.603) (0.436) (0.701) 
King´s Cup 0.815 1.103 1.023 0.709 0.890 0.420 1.048 0.178* 
 (0.116) (0.0825) (0.142) (0.210) (0.302) (0.440) (0.381) (0.181) 
Champions League 1.070 1.015 1.215** 0.893 0.827 1.162 0.950 0.743 
 (0.127) (0.0405) (0.104) (0.196) (0.231) (0.458) (0.320) (0.248) 
Domestic League 0.845*** 0.907*** 0.937 0.819** 0.763* 1.032 0.680** 0.750 
 (0.0517) (0.0269) (0.0498) (0.0800) (0.108) (0.259) (0.124) (0.136) 
Super Cups 1.044 0.927 0.822 1.082 1.6e-08*** 2.977 1.6e-08*** 1.889 
 (0.360) (0.215) (0.226) (0.332) (8.37e-09) (3.099) (9.52e-09) (1.308) 
Observations 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 
Hour of the day YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the week YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the month YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day of the year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Week of the year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month of the year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In general, some climate variables are related to crime behavior. For instance, longer 
days in terms of sun hours, warmer days in terms of temperature, calm days in terms of 
                                                          
19 Note that in our case, a priori, there is a similar profile of football supporters and that of (potential) 
offenders: basically young males. 
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 wind speed, and non-rainy days, are related to higher crime rates (especially property 
crimes). 
 
Table 7: Hours prior to and after FCB home matches. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Robberies Thefts Criminal damage 
Violent 
crimes 
Gender 
violence
Against 
police 
Driving 
crimes Drugs 
T - 7 0.916 0.966 1.045 0.763* 0.936 1.020 0.933 0.655 
 (0.0811) (0.0288) (0.0729) (0.120) (0.164) (0.306) (0.197) (0.289) 
T - 6 0.826** 0.944** 0.977 0.827 0.901 0.941 0.810 0.634 
 (0.0702) (0.0247) (0.0835) (0.112) (0.167) (0.271) (0.168) (0.207) 
T - 5 0.892 0.919*** 0.908 0.770* 0.787 0.824 0.844 0.679 
 (0.0759) (0.0264) (0.0801) (0.115) (0.155) (0.238) (0.124) (0.175) 
T - 4 0.929 0.983 0.922 0.668*** 0.808 0.954 0.737* 0.692* 
 (0.0732) (0.0272) (0.0830) (0.0814) (0.154) (0.271) (0.115) (0.151) 
T - 3 0.896 0.966 0.963 0.898 1.090 0.607 0.587*** 0.678**
 (0.0655) (0.0257) (0.0656) (0.112) (0.167) (0.186) (0.112) (0.134) 
T - 2 0.948 1.014 1.101 0.954 0.945 0.561* 0.618*** 0.728* 
 (0.0626) (0.0308) (0.0696) (0.0988) (0.151) (0.190) (0.113) (0.132) 
T - 1 0.928 1.154*** 1.107* 0.989 0.917 0.865 0.715* 0.533**
 (0.0602) (0.0328) (0.0670) (0.101) (0.155) (0.216) (0.137) (0.136) 
T + 1 1.052 1.429*** 0.963 0.789* 0.959 1.062 0.880 0.673* 
 (0.0797) (0.0619) (0.0585) (0.103) (0.189) (0.309) (0.124) (0.153) 
T + 2 1.086 1.325*** 1.148** 0.964 0.780 1.245 0.920 1.047 
 (0.0955) (0.0760) (0.0760) (0.117) (0.124) (0.366) (0.118) (0.182) 
T + 3 1.102 1.252*** 1.311*** 1.262* 0.999 2.002** 0.928 0.745 
 (0.106) (0.0778) (0.113) (0.155) (0.257) (0.575) (0.117) (0.205) 
T + 4 1.149 1.203*** 1.238** 1.251* 1.004 1.892** 1.051 1.059 
 (0.100) (0.0849) (0.131) (0.166) (0.138) (0.523) (0.116) (0.205) 
T + 5 1.347*** 1.235*** 1.091 1.175 1.016 1.368 0.911 0.933 
 (0.121) (0.0937) (0.139) (0.149) (0.136) (0.322) (0.0941) (0.213) 
T + 6 1.429*** 1.331*** 1.113 1.018 1.088 1.347 1.082 0.696 
 (0.133) (0.105) (0.119) (0.114) (0.169) (0.288) (0.0956) (0.238) 
T + 7 1.332*** 1.261*** 0.893 1.150 1.039 0.770 0.946 0.882 
 (0.128) (0.102) (0.107) (0.120) (0.166) (0.214) (0.102) (0.328) 
Observations 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 
Climate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Yearly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lunar phase YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Holiday dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of competition YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: Climate controls include: average rainfall, average number of sun hours, average temperature, 
average pressure and average wind speed. Time controls include: hour of the day, day of the week, day of 
the month, day of the year, week of the year, month and year. Seasonal controls include dummies for 
summer (mainly September) and winter. Type of competition includes dummies for: Spanish Domestic 
League, European Champions League, Spanish King’s Cup and Super Cups (both Spanish and 
International). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We examine in greater depth the temporal profile of crime and the way in which 
football can shape it in Table 7 by presenting the detailed results of crime in the hours 
leading up to and following FCB home matches. On the one hand, in the pre-match 
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 hours there seems to be fewer Driving crimes and Drug related crimes. In the case of 
interpersonal Violent crimes there also seems to be a reduction in the crime rate, but at a 
much earlier point in the day (between four and five hours before the match). In the case 
of Thefts (primarily pick pocketing), in the hour immediately prior to the match, the 
number of thefts increases by around 15%. Less robust is the increase (10%) found for 
Criminal damage one hour prior to kick-off. 
In the hours following the match there seems to be a marked increase in crime. This 
result is, as expected, very strong and robust for Thefts. Victory celebrations bring 
supporters out on to the streets making them targets for thieves. The number of Thefts 
peaks just one hour after the match, but the impact of the event remains significant 
throughout the night (up to seven hours after the match). Likewise, an increase in the 
number of Robberies (thefts involve some sort of violence) is recorded, especially five 
hours after the final whistle, along with more instances of Criminal damage, Violent 
crimes and crimes Against police between three and four hours after the match. These 
results are related to post-match activities that include victory celebrations and/or going 
out after the match. 
Tables 8 and 9 show the results for away matches, given that a city with a major 
team will have a large number of supporters that are liable to modify criminal patterns, 
even when the team plays away. 
 
Table 8: FCB away matches and crime in the city during the game. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Robberies Thefts Criminal damage 
Violent 
crimes 
Gender 
violence
Against 
police 
Driving 
crimes Drugs 
Away match  0.934 0.951** 0.991 0.989 0.784* 1.507* 0.797* 0.533***
 (0.0727) (0.0241) (0.0451) (0.0891) (0.106) (0.321) (0.109) (0.0956) 
Observations 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 
Climate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Yearly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lunar phase YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Holiday dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of competition YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: see notes to Table 7. 
 
Table 8 shows a significant reduction in Drug related crimes and Thefts and a 
reduction (albeit less strong in terms of statistical significance) of Gender Violence and 
Driving crimes. Again, these results could be driven by an incapacitation effect during 
21
 the match.20 Table 8 also shows a slightly significant increase in the number of recorded 
crimes Against police: the coefficient seems to be positive and significant at the 10% 
level indicating an increase in the number of crimes of 50.7%. This result might be 
attributed to the celebrations of the football fans who meet in bars or at specific 
locations in the city.21 
 
Table 9. Hours prior to and after FCB away matches. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Robberies Thefts Criminal damage 
Violent 
crimes 
Gender 
Violence
Against 
Police 
Driving 
crimes Drugs 
T - 7 0.899 0.912*** 1.040 0.916 1.264 1.145 0.835 0.874 
 (0.0664) (0.0232) (0.0826) (0.118) (0.195) (0.335) (0.185) (0.372) 
T - 6 0.765*** 0.898*** 0.964 0.922 0.670** 1.134 0.686 0.858 
 (0.0635) (0.0249) (0.0831) (0.112) (0.132) (0.306) (0.204) (0.274) 
T - 5 0.925 0.922*** 0.956 0.886 0.988 1.387 0.946 0.922 
 (0.0684) (0.0262) (0.0842) (0.110) (0.180) (0.349) (0.132) (0.180) 
T - 4 0.903 0.936*** 1.024 0.789* 1.228 0.892 0.640 0.799 
 (0.0675) (0.0240) (0.0875) (0.0969) (0.190) (0.287) (0.223) (0.164) 
T - 3 0.936 0.924*** 0.866** 0.953 0.955 0.683 0.973 0.910 
 (0.0608) (0.0276) (0.0614) (0.100) (0.158) (0.200) (0.137) (0.161) 
T - 2 0.999 0.909*** 0.932 1.023 1.049 1.303 0.818 0.777 
 (0.0646) (0.0228) (0.0645) (0.120) (0.146) (0.374) (0.129) (0.145) 
T - 1 0.873** 0.917*** 1.034 0.794* 0.965 0.662 0.719* 0.759 
 (0.0592) (0.0289) (0.0644) (0.0949) (0.157) (0.199) (0.141) (0.135) 
T + 1 0.934 0.951 1.062 1.008 1.092 0.784 0.900 0.890 
 (0.0727) (0.0433) (0.0706) (0.121) (0.144) (0.230) (0.134) (0.168) 
T + 2 1.164* 1.152*** 1.173** 0.970 0.866 0.831 0.972 0.905 
 (0.0937) (0.0591) (0.0826) (0.118) (0.114) (0.202) (0.128) (0.167) 
T + 3 1.220** 1.165** 1.183** 0.870 1.145 1.451 0.983 1.250 
 (0.103) (0.0753) (0.0861) (0.111) (0.165) (0.358) (0.105) (0.195) 
T + 4 1.110 1.232*** 0.974 1.143 1.274 1.447 1.191* 1.299 
 (0.101) (0.0755) (0.0864) (0.140) (0.199) (0.347) (0.110) (0.240) 
T + 5 1.099 1.218*** 1.246*** 1.022 1.025 1.261 1.022 0.710 
 (0.123) (0.0841) (0.100) (0.124) (0.187) (0.290) (0.106) (0.194) 
T + 6 1.165 1.340*** 1.193* 1.264** 1.285 0.866 1.013 1.683**
 (0.116) (0.0949) (0.120) (0.144) (0.246) (0.199) (0.106) (0.359) 
T + 7 1.165 1.339*** 1.192* 1.264** 1.284 0.866 1.013 1.682**
 (0.116) (0.0948) (0.120) (0.144) (0.245) (0.199) (0.106) (0.358) 
Observations 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 29,123 
Climate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Monthly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Yearly trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Lunar phase YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Holiday dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of competition YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: see notes to Table 7. 
                                                          
20 Note that in Table 5 we include attendance at home games. If we perform a similar regression as that 
presented in Table 8 but with a dummy variable indicating home match we also find a reduction in the 
crime committed in the city during the hours of the game. 
21 Barcelona football fans traditionally meet at the Canaletes fountain in the city center to celebrate their 
victories.  
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 Table 9 presents the time profile of crime in the hours leading up to and following 
FCB away matches. In this case the results seem quite clear: Thefts fall prior to the 
game and increase after it (at an increasing rate whereas after home games the rate 
appears to decrease with time). Some weak evidence of a lower level of crime prior to 
the game can also be observed for Robberies, Violent crimes, and Driving crimes. In 
common with home games, in the hours following the match, people typically go to 
bars and meet with friends to celebrate or to console themselves in defeat. This can 
create large crowds that attract pick pockets, increase Criminal damage (including 
urban furniture) or, by increasing the level of social interaction, lead to higher levels of 
interpersonal violence. 
In sum, the results obtained for the temporal impact of away matches on crime 
broadly confirm the patterns observed for home matches. The differences observed can 
be attributed to the spatial dimension, which has purposefully been omitted from the 
present analysis. Clearly, the high spatial concentration of individuals when FCB play at 
home is likely to be the driver for some of the results obtained during home matches 
and not during away matches, such as the increase in crimes Against police observed 
during home games. 
 
6. Further results: gender violence 
Note that all the results obtained up to this point seem to indicate that football 
matches do not have any effect on Gender violence. However, and as reported by Card 
and Dahl (2011), what seems to spark family violence (and violence in general) are 
defeats. Indeed, in such instances the authors find a direct relationship between these 
emotional cues and crime22 which suggests this type of crime may occur after a football 
match. Here, our results (see Table 10) point to the presence of this temporal 
displacement effect, indicating that it is a relevant crime type to analyze from a 
temporal perspective. Indeed our results show a positive and significant effect of defeats 
on Gender violence. 
Thus, from between two and four hours after a defeat, there appears to be an effect 
on violent behavior in a family related environment, with such crimes rising by up to 
150%. A similar result was reported by Card and Dahl (2011) for the case of the NFL in 
North America. In the case of non-family Violent crimes, there does not appear to be a 
                                                          
22 Our sample includes 25 defeats and 56 draws in total. Of these, 15 defeats and 38 draws occurred in 
away matches. 
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 consistent increase, though five hours after a defeat an increase in the number of violent 
crimes is noted. 
 
Table 10: Psychological effects of an FCB defeat.  
 Violent crimes Gender violence 
T + 1 0.658 0.932 
 (0.296) (0.464) 
T + 2 0.813 1.565* 
 (0.416) (0.411) 
T + 3 0.827 1.045 
 (0.380) (0.405) 
T + 4 1.104 1.673** 
 (0.565) (0.439) 
T + 5 1.353 0.826 
 (0.552) (0.369) 
T + 6 3.050*** 1.057 
 (1.004) (0.297) 
T + 7 1.418 1.069 
 (0.711) 0.932 
Observations 29,123 29,123 
Climate controls YES YES 
Time controls YES YES 
Seasonal controls YES YES 
Monthly trends YES YES 
Yearly trends YES YES 
Lunar phase YES YES 
Holiday dummy YES YES 
Derby dummy YES YES 
Type of competition YES YES 
Note: see notes to Table 7. 
 
7. Discussion 
The results reported above regarding the temporal displacement effect of football 
matches on crime rates require a fuller discussion. As already mentioned, the results 
associated with home matches can be explained if we take into account the spatial 
dimension. For instance, the fact that the number of Thefts increases an hour before the 
match would seem to indicate that offenders take advantage of the agglomeration of 
supporters entering (or congregating near) the stadium. Although a proper spatial 
analysis needs to be conducted to confirm that this increase in Thefts is due to the 
agglomeration of football fans, the fact that a similar increase does not occur before 
away matches provides partial confirmation. 
The results obtained in the hours leading up to a home match can be accounted for 
in terms of a substitution effect. That is, since large numbers of police officers are 
deployed in order to safeguard citizen security around the stadium, less attention is 
given to other criminal activities (for instance, drug consumption, dangerous driving or 
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 alcohol consumption) and so crime reports fall (especially since these crimes are 
reported by the authorities themselves). In the case of Drug related crimes this effect 
also appears to last for an hour after the game. These results again are confirmed by the 
apparent effect of away matches, which as expected present no impact on these types of 
crime, given the absence of any substitution effect. 
Importantly, therefore, our estimates, after controlling for a wide range of possible 
temporal determinants, indicate that certain crime types increase after FCB football 
matches. Some of these increases can be attributed to victory celebrations or the 
commencement of weekend leisure activities after watching the game, accompanied by 
consumption of alcohol. This is the case of Robberies, Criminal damage, and Violent 
crimes, regardless of whether FCB have played at home or away (albeit in different time 
spans), indicating that this impact can be attributed, in general, to the euphoria 
occasioned by football. Logically, crimes Against the police only increase after home 
matches, attributable to agglomerations and problems of euphoric crowds clashing with 
police officers in the vicinity of the stadium. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper has presented the first detailed temporal analysis of crime in an urban 
context, with a particular focus on the hourly displacement of crime patterns attributable 
to the scheduling of a major sporting event (i.e., FC Barcelona’s football matches). In 
short, we have analyzed the principal effects of these games on crime before, during and 
after the match.  
First, as expected, the results reveal a clear time pattern for criminal activities. 
Although different patterns are found according to the specific type of crime under 
analysis, we can report a number of stylized facts. Crimes most closely associated with 
leisure activities (e.g., crimes Against police, Driving crimes and Drug related crimes) 
peak late at night, presenting low rates during the day-time which increase as the 
evening progresses. Crimes against property (Robberies, Thefts and Criminal damage) 
peak after 18:00 (associated with people coming out of work on weekdays), but fall 
again as the night progresses. Crimes involving violence (Violent crimes and Gender 
violence) gradually increase throughout the day and peak in the evenings. Additionally, 
we find evidence of a week-end effect for all crimes, while some types of crime present 
a marked seasonal pattern, especially those most closely associated with tourism 
(Violent crimes and Thefts). 
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 Second, our results point to the temporal impact of football matches on crime rates. 
Thus, we find a fall in some types of crime in the hours before an FCB football match is 
played and an increase in some types of crime afterwards. The reduction in crime prior 
to a match would appear to be capturing the incapacitation effect of potential offenders, 
whereas the post-match increase appears to depend on the type of crime. Thus, increases 
in Thefts, Robberies and Criminal damage occur regardless of whether FCB have 
played at home or away, indicating that offenders are taking advantage of victory 
celebrations or the initiation of post-match leisure activities. Other significant increases 
appear to be related to the spatial distribution of individuals in association with the 
match that has just been played; thus, for instance, the increase in crimes Against police 
reported after home games but not after away matches appears to point to the impact of 
spatial concentration on crime. 
Our study identifies an interesting impact that is likely to be related to the possible 
substitution effect experienced by some types of crime and which reflects the specific 
deployment of police resources during a football match. In general, during major events, 
such as FCB matches, police officers inevitably switch their attention away from 
fighting certain types of crime in favor of safeguarding citizen security in and around 
the event. For example, police check points or random checkpoints are not manned with 
the subsequent fall in the number of reports of drunk driving, drug consumption or drug 
smuggling.  
In general, football matches do not appear to have any impact on rates of Gender 
violence; however, an increase is noted when the sample is restricted to those games in 
which FCB were defeated, and so we obtain some evidence of a link between sports 
results and violence in the family. 
The results reported herein provide new, broader evidence on the crime patterns 
produced on football match days, pointing to the temporal displacement effects that 
football matches may have on crime. As such, it is our belief that these results can be 
useful in determining the temporal deployment of police officers on match days as well 
as in understanding the way in which offenders behave according to the characteristics 
of a match day. Further research needs to be focused on spatial analyses, which should 
illustrate how the crimes are spatially distributed across the city and how football 
matches can alter these crime patterns. Similarly, closer collaboration with police 
agencies should improve the data available for researchers, since knowledge of the 
26
 actual allocation of police officers and their deployment during a match is essential for 
identifying crime displacement and concentration effects. 
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